Securities Lending Strategies: Exclusive Valuations and Auction Bids

Ravi Kashyap

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We derive valuations of a portfolio of financial instruments from a securities lending perspective, under different assumptions, and show a weighting scheme that converges to the true valuation. We illustrate conditions under which our alternative weighting scheme converges faster to the true valuation when compared to the minimum variance weighting. This weighting scheme is applicable in any situation where multiple forecasts are made and we need a methodology to combine them. Our valuations can be useful either to derive a bidding strategy for an exclusive auction or to design an appropriate auction mechanism, depending on which side of the fence a participant sits (whether the interest is to procure the rights to use a portfolio for making stock loans such as for a lending desk, or, to obtain additional revenue from a portfolio such as from the point of view of a long only asset management firm). Lastly, we run simulations to establish numerical examples for the set of valuations and for various bidding strategies corresponding to different auction settings.

Date: 2016-03, Revised 2019-07
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