Risk Aversion and Catastrophic Risks: the Pill Experiment

Julien Blasco and Graciela Chichilnisky

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This article focuses on the work of O. Chanel and G. Chichilnisky (2013) on the flaws of expected utility theory while assessing the value of life. Expected utility is a fundamental tool in decision theory. However, it does not fit with the experimental results when it comes to catastrophic outcomes ---see, for example, Chichilnisky (2009) for more details. In the experiments conducted by Olivier Chanel in 1998 and 2009, several subjects are ask to imagine they are presented 1 billion identical pills. They are paid \$220,000 to take and swallow one, knowing that one out of 1 billion is deadly. The objective of this article is to show that risk aversion phenomenon cannot explain the experimental results found. This is an additional reason why a new kind of utility function is necessary: the axioms proposed by Graciela Chichilnisky will be briefly presented, and it will be shown that it better fits with experiments than any risk aversion utility function.

Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-rmg and nep-upt
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