Self-organization in a distributed coordination game through heuristic rules

S. Agarwal, Diptesh Ghosh () and A. S. Chakrabarti

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$ agents play a coordination game repeatedly which has exactly $N$ Nash equilibria and all of the equilibria are equally preferred by the agents. The problem is to select one equilibrium out of $N$ possible equilibria in the least number of attempts. We propose a number of heuristic rules based on reinforcement learning to solve the coordination problem. We see that the agents self-organize into clusters with varying intensities depending on the heuristic rule applied although all clusters but one are transitory in most cases. Finally, we characterize a trade-off in terms of the time requirement to achieve a degree of stability in strategies and the efficiency of such a solution.

Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Self-organization in a distributed coordination game through heuristic rules (2016)
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