Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules
Martin Lackner and
Papers from arXiv.org
This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based multi-winner rules, i.e., voting rules that select a fixed-size group of candidates based on approval ballots. We introduce the class of counting rules and provide an axiomatic characterization of this class based on the consistency axiom. Building upon this result, we axiomatically characterize three important consistent multi-winner rules: Proportional Approval Voting, Multi-Winner Approval Voting and the Approval Chamberlin--Courant rule. Our results demonstrate the variety of multi-winner rules and illustrate three different, orthogonal principles that multi-winner voting rules may represent: individual excellence, diversity, and proportionality.
Date: 2017-04, Revised 2019-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1704.02453
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