EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Best reply structure and equilibrium convergence in generic games

Marco Pangallo (), Torsten Heinrich () and J. Farmer ()

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in terms of best reply dynamics, in which each player myopically uses the best response to her opponent's last move. Existing research shows that convergence can be problematic when there are best reply cycles. Here we calculate how typical this is by studying the space of all possible two-player normal form games and counting the frequency of best reply cycles. The two key parameters are the number of moves, which defines how complicated the game is, and the anti-correlation of the payoffs, which determines how competitive it is. We find that as games get more complicated and more competitive, best reply cycles become dominant. The existence of best reply cycles predicts non-convergence of six different learning algorithms that have support from human experiments. Our results imply that for complicated and competitive games equilibrium is typically an unrealistic assumption. Alternatively, if for some reason "real" games are special and do not possess cycles, we raise the interesting question of why this should be so.

Date: 2017-04, Revised 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.05276 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1704.05276

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2020-09-21
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1704.05276