A Partial Solution to Continuous Blotto
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This paper analyzes the structure of mixed-strategy equilibria for Colonel Blotto games, where the outcome on each battlefield is a polynomial function of the difference between the two players' allocations. This paper severely reduces the set of strategies that needs to be searched to find a Nash equilibrium. It finds that there exists a Nash equilibrium where both players' mixed strategies are discrete distributions, and it places an upper bound on the number of points in the supports of these discrete distributions.
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Date: 2017-06, Revised 2017-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1706.08479
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