Spontaneous Segregation of Agents Across Double Auction Markets

Aleksandra Alori\'c, Peter Sollich and Peter McBurney

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the possibility of spontaneous segregation into groups of traders that have to choose among several markets. Even in the simplest case of two markets and Zero Intelligence traders, we are able to observe segregation effects below a critical value Tc of the temperature T; the latter regulates how strongly traders bias their decisions towards choices with large accumulated scores. It is notable that segregation occurs even though the traders are statistically homogeneous. Traders can in principle change their loyalty to a market, but the relevant persistence times become long below Tc.

Date: 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-exp
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Published in Advances in Artificial Economics (2015) pp 79-90. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 676. Springer, Cham

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1708.09327

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