Inference on Auctions with Weak Assumptions on Information

Vasilis Syrgkanis (), Elie Tamer and Juba Ziani

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Given a sample of bids from independent auctions, this paper examines the question of inference on auction fundamentals (e.g. valuation distributions, welfare measures) under weak assumptions on information structure. The question is important as it allows us to learn about the valuation distribution in a robust way, i.e., without assuming that a particular information structure holds across observations. We leverage the recent contributions of \cite{Bergemann2013} in the robust mechanism design literature that exploit the link between Bayesian Correlated Equilibria and Bayesian Nash Equilibria in incomplete information games to construct an econometrics framework for learning about auction fundamentals using observed data on bids. We showcase our construction of identified sets in private value and common value auctions. Our approach for constructing these sets inherits the computational simplicity of solving for correlated equilibria: checking whether a particular valuation distribution belongs to the identified set is as simple as determining whether a {\it linear} program is feasible. A similar linear program can be used to construct the identified set on various welfare measures and counterfactual objects. For inference and to summarize statistical uncertainty, we propose novel finite sample methods using tail inequalities that are used to construct confidence regions on sets. We also highlight methods based on Bayesian bootstrap and subsampling. A set of Monte Carlo experiments show adequate finite sample properties of our inference procedures. We illustrate our methods using data from OCS auctions.

Date: 2017-10, Revised 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-des, nep-ecm and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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