Games of Incomplete Information and Myopic Equilibria

R. Simon, S. Spiez and H. Torunczyk

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Abstract: A new concept of an equilibrium in games is introduced that solves an open question posed by A. Neyman.

Date: 2017-11, Revised 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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