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Characterizing Assumption of Rationality by Incomplete Information

Shuige Liu

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Abstract: We characterize common assumption of rationality of 2-person games within an incomplete information framework. We use the lexicographic model with incomplete information and show that a belief hierarchy expresses common assumption of rationality within a complete information framework if and only if there is a belief hierarchy within the corresponding incomplete information framework that expresses common full belief in caution, rationality, every good choice is supported, and prior belief in the original utility functions.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
Date: 2018-01
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