Promoting cooperation by reputation-driven group formation

Han-Xin Yang and Zhen Wang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In previous studies of spatial public goods game, each player is able to establish a group. However, in real life, some players cannot successfully organize groups for various reasons. In this paper, we propose a mechanism of reputation-driven group formation, in which groups can only be organized by players whose reputation reaches or exceeds a threshold. We define a player's reputation as the frequency of cooperation in the last $T$ time steps. We find that the highest cooperation level can be obtained when groups are only established by pure cooperators who always cooperate in the last $T$ time steps. Effects of the memory length $T$ on cooperation are also studied.

Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Published in J. Stat. Mech. (2017) 023403

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