Long-Term Unemployed hirings: Should targeted or untargeted policies be preferred?

Alessandra Pasquini, Marco Centra and Guido Pellegrini
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Alessandra Pasquini: MEMOTEF Department Sapienza University of Rome, INAPP, Scienze Sociali ed Eonomiche Department Sapienza University of Rome
Marco Centra: MEMOTEF Department Sapienza University of Rome, INAPP, Scienze Sociali ed Eonomiche Department Sapienza University of Rome

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Abstract: To what extent, hiring incentives targeting a specific group of vulnerable unemployed (i.e. long term unemployed) are more effective, with respect to generalised incentives (without a definite target), to increase hirings of the targeted group? Are generalized incentives able to influence hirings of the vulnerable group? Do targeted policies have negative side effects too important to accept them? Even though there is a huge literature on hiring subsidies, these questions remained unresolved. We tried to answer them, comparing the impact of two similar hiring policies, one oriented towards a target group and one generalised, implemented on the italian labour market. We used administrative data on job contracts, and counterfactual analysis methods. The targeted policy had a positive and significant impact, while the generalized policy didn't have a significant impact on the vulnerable group. Moreover, we concluded the targeted policy didn't have any indirect negative side effect.

Date: 2018-02, Revised 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur
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