Achieving perfect coordination amongst agents in the co-action minority game

Hardik Rajpal and Deepak Dhar

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We discuss the strategy that rational agents can use to maximize their expected long-term payoff in the co-action minority game. We argue that the agents will try to get into a cyclic state, where each of the $(2N +1)$ agent wins exactly $N$ times in any continuous stretch of $(2N+1)$ days. We propose and analyse a strategy for reaching such a cyclic state quickly, when any direct communication between agents is not allowed, and only the publicly available common information is the record of total number of people choosing the first restaurant in the past. We determine exactly the average time required to reach the periodic state for this strategy. We show that it varies as $(N/\ln 2) [1 + \alpha \cos (2 \pi \log_2 N)$], for large $N$, where the amplitude $\alpha$ of the leading term in the log-periodic oscillations is found be $\frac{8 \pi^2}{(\ln 2)^2} \exp{(- 2 \pi^2/\ln 2)} \approx {\color{blue}7 \times 10^{-11}}$.

Date: 2018-02, Revised 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Games, ( 2018), Vol. 9, p27

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.06770 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1802.06770

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().