Proxyeconomics, the inevitable corruption of proxy-based competition

Oliver Braganza

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: When society maintains a competitive system to promote an abstract goal, competition by necessity relies on imperfect proxy measures. For instance profit is used to measure value to consumers, patient volumes to measure hospital performance, or the Journal Impact Factor to measure scientific value. Here we note that \textit{any proxy measure in a competitive societal system becomes a target for the competitors, promoting corruption of the measure}, suggesting a general applicability of what is best known as Campbell's or Goodhart's Law. Indeed, prominent voices have argued that the scientific reproducibility crisis or inaction to the threat of global warming represent instances of such competition induced corruption. Moreover, competing individuals often report that competitive pressures limit their ability to act according to the societal goal, suggesting lock-in. However, despite the profound implications, we lack a coherent theory of such a process. Here we propose such a theory, formalized as an agent based model, integrating insights from complex systems theory, contest theory, behavioral economics and cultural evolution theory. The model reproduces empirically observed patterns at multiple levels. It further suggests that any system is likely to converge towards an equilibrium level of corruption determined by i) the information captured in the proxy and ii) the strength of an intrinsic incentive towards the societal goal. Overall, the theory offers mechanistic insight to subjects as diverse as the scientific reproducibility crisis and the threat of global warming.

Date: 2018-03, Revised 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-hme
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