Reputation is required for cooperation to emerge in dynamic networks

Jose A. Cuesta, Carlos Gracia-L\'azaro, Yamir Moreno and Angel S\'anchez

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Melamed, Harrell, and Simpson have recently reported on an experiment which appears to show that cooperation can arise in a dynamic network without reputational knowledge, i.e., purely via dynamics [1]. We believe that their experimental design is actually not testing this, in so far as players do know the last action of their current partners before making a choice on their own next action and subsequently deciding which link to cut. Had the authors given no information at all, the result would be a decline in cooperation as shown in [2].

Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.06035 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1803.06035

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().