Emergence of Cooperation in the thermodynamic limit

Colin Benjamin and Shubhayan Sarkar

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Predicting how cooperative behavior arises in the thermodynamic limit is one of the outstanding problems in evolutionary game theory. For two player games, cooperation is seldom the Nash equilibrium. However, in the thermodynamic limit cooperation is the natural recourse regardless of whether we are dealing with humans or animals. In this work, we use the analogy with the Ising model to predict how cooperation arises in the thermodynamic limit.

Date: 2018-03, Revised 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Published in Chaos, Solitons and Fractals 135, 109762 (2020)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1803.10083

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