Triggers for cooperative behavior in the thermodynamic limit: a case study in Public goods game

Colin Benjamin and Shubhayan Sarkar

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this work, we aim to answer the question: what triggers cooperative behavior in the thermodynamic limit by taking recourse to the Public goods game. Using the idea of mapping the 1D Ising model Hamiltonian with nearest neighbor coupling to payoffs in the game theory we calculate the Magnetisation of the game in the thermodynamic limit. We see a phase transition in the thermodynamic limit of the two player Public goods game. We observe that punishment acts as an external field for the two player Public goods game triggering cooperation or provide strategy, while cost can be a trigger for suppressing cooperation or free riding. Finally, reward also acts as a trigger for providing while the role of inverse temperature (fluctuations in choices) is to introduce randomness in strategic choices.

Date: 2018-04, Revised 2019-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Published in Chaos 29, 053131 (2019)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1804.06465

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