Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution
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A general framework of evolutionary dynamics under heterogeneous populations is presented. The framework allows continuously many types of heterogeneous agents, heterogeneity both in payoff functions and in revision protocols and the entire joint distribution of strategies and types to influence the payoffs of agents. We clarify regularity conditions for the unique existence of a solution trajectory and for the existence of equilibrium. We confirm that equilibrium stationarity in general and equilibrium stability in potential games are extended from the homogeneous setting to the heterogeneous setting. In particular, a wide class of admissible dynamics share the same set of locally stable equilibria in a potential game through local maximization of the potential.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
Date: 2018-05, Revised 2019-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1805.04897
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