 A self-organized criticality participative pricing mechanism for selling zero-marginal cost productsDaniel Fraiman Abstract: In today's economy, selling a new zero-marginal cost product is a real challenge, as it is difficult to determine a product's "correct" sales price based on its profit and dissemination. As an example, think of the price of a new app or video game. New sales mechanisms for selling this type of product need to be designed, in particular ones that consider consumer preferences and reality. Current auction mechanisms establish a time deadline for the auction to take place. This deadline is set to increase the number of bidders and thus the final offering price. Consumers want to obtain the product as quickly as possible from the moment they become interested in it, and this time does not always coincide with the seller's deadline. Naturally, consumers also want to pay a price they consider "fair". Here we introduce an auction model where buyers continuously place bids and the challenge is to decide quickly whether or not to accept them. The model does not include a deadline for placing bids, and exhibits self-organized criticality; it presents a critical price from which a bid is accepted with probability one, and avalanches of sales above this value are observed. This model is of particular interest for startup companies interested in profit as well as making the product known on the market. Date: 2018-05, Revised 2021-07 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1805.09763 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Papers from arXiv.org |
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