A rational decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking for energy markets

Lorenzo Nespoli, Matteo Salani and Vasco Medici

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Abstract: We propose a method to design a decentralized energy market which guarantees individual rationality (IR) in expectation, in the presence of system-level grid constraints. We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problem subject to IR constraints, and we make use of Lagrangian duality to model the problem as a n-person non-cooperative game with a unique generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). We provide a distributed algorithm which converges to the GNE. The convergence and properties of the algorithm are investigated by means of numerical simulations.

Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1806.01072

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