Robust Pricing with Refunds

Toomas Hinnosaar and Keiichi Kawai

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Before purchase, a buyer of an experience good learns about the product's fit using various information sources, including some of which the seller may be unaware of. The buyer, however, can conclusively learn the fit only after purchasing and trying out the product. We show that the seller can use a simple mechanism to best take advantage of the buyer's post-purchase learning to maximize his guaranteed-profit. We show that this mechanism combines a generous refund, which performs well when the buyer is relatively informed, with non-refundable random discounts, which work well when the buyer is relatively uninformed.

Date: 2018-08, Revised 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Robust pricing with refunds (2020)
Working Paper: Robust Pricing with Refunds (2020)
Working Paper: Robust Pricing with Refunds (2018)
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