The Structure of Equilibria in Trading Networks with Frictions

Jan Christoph Schlegel

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility and in the presence of frictions. While our results are developed in a trading network model, they also imply analogous (and new) results for exchange economies with combinatorial demand and for two-sided matching markets with transfers.

Date: 2018-08, Revised 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1808.07924

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