k-price auctions and Combination auctions
Martin Mihelich and
Papers from arXiv.org
We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for $k$- price auctions. We also introduce a new type of auction and demonstrate that it has fair solutions other than the second price auctions, therefore paving the way for replacing second price auctions.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
Date: 2018-09, Revised 2019-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1810.03494
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