Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice

Maria Kyropoulou, Josu\'e Ortega and Erel Segal-Halevi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Using a lab experiment, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. We find that envy-free procedures, in particular Selfridge-Conway, are fairer and also are perceived as fairer than their proportional counterparts, despite the fact that agents very often manipulate them. Our results support the practical use of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway procedure, and more generally, of envy-free cake-cutting mechanisms. We also find that subjects learn their opponents' preferences after repeated interaction and use this knowledge to improve their allocated share of the cake. Learning reduces truth-telling behavior, but also reduces envy.

Date: 2018-10, Revised 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825622000331

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