Expropriations, Property Confiscations and New Offshore Entities: Evidence from the Panama Papers

Ralph-C Bayer (), Roland Hodler, Paul Raschky and Anthony Strittmatter

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Using the Panama Papers, we show that the beginning of media reporting on expropriations and property confiscations in a country increases the probability that offshore entities are incorporated by agents from the same country in the same month. This result is robust to the use of country-year fixed effects and the exclusion of tax havens. Further analysis shows that the effect is driven by countries with non-corrupt and effective governments, which supports the notion that offshore entities are incorporated when reasonably well-intended and well-functioning governments become more serious about fighting organized crime by confiscating proceeds of crime.

Date: 2018-10
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2020, vol. 171, pp. 132-152

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Related works:
Journal Article: Expropriations, property confiscations and new offshore entities: Evidence from the Panama Papers (2020)
Working Paper: Expropriations, Property Confiscations and New Offshore Entities: Evidence from the Panama Papers (2018)
Working Paper: Expropriations, Property Confiscations and New Offshore Entities: Evidence from the Panama Papers (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1810.09876

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