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The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large

Josu\'e Ortega

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Abstract: Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst-case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent's spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.

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Date: 2018-10
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Published in Economics Letters, Volume 174, January 2019, Pages 48-51

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