The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large
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Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst-case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent's spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.
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Published in Economics Letters, Volume 174, January 2019, Pages 48-51
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1810.10287
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