Constrained Information Design

Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We provide tools to analyze information design problems subject to constraints. We do so by extending the insight in Le Treust and Tomala (2019) to the case of multiple inequality and equality constraints. Namely, that an information design problem subject to constraints can be represented as an unconstrained information design problem with a additional states, one for each constraint. Thus, without loss of generality, optimal solutions induce as many posteriors as the number of states and constraints. We provide results that refine this upper bound. Furthermore, we provide conditions under which there is no duality gap in constrained information design, thus validating a Lagrangian approach. We illustrate our results with applications to mechanism design with limited commitment (Doval and Skreta, 2022a) and persuasion of a privately informed receiver (Kolotilin et al., 2017).

Date: 2018-11, Revised 2022-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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