Selection mechanisms affect volatility in evolving markets
David Rushing Dewhurst,
Michael Vincent Arnold and
Colin Michael Van Oort
Papers from arXiv.org
Financial asset markets are sociotechnical systems whose constituent agents are subject to evolutionary pressure as unprofitable agents exit the marketplace and more profitable agents continue to trade assets. Using a population of evolving zero-intelligence agents and a frequent batch auction price-discovery mechanism as substrate, we analyze the role played by evolutionary selection mechanisms in determining macro-observable market statistics. In particular, we show that selection mechanisms incorporating a local fitness-proportionate component are associated with high correlation between a micro, risk-aversion parameter and a commonly-used macro-volatility statistic, while a purely quantile-based selection mechanism shows significantly less correlation.
Date: 2018-12, Revised 2019-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1812.05657
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