Cartel Stability under Quality Differentiation

Iwan Bos and Marco Marini

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If market shares are maintained at pre-collusive levels, then the firm with the lowest competitive price-cost margin has the strongest incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement. The lowest-quality supplier has the tightest incentive constraint when the difference in unit production costs is sufficiently small.

Date: 2018-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Economics Letters, 174, 70-73, 2019

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1812.10293 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Cartel stability under quality differentiation (2019)
Working Paper: Cartel Stability under Quality Differentiation (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1812.10293

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().