Optimal Insurance with Limited Commitment in a Finite Horizon

Junkee Jeon, Hyeng Keun Koo and Kyunghyun Park

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a finite horizon optimal contracting problem of a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent who receives a stochastic income stream when the agent is unable to make commitments. The problem involves an infinite number of constraints at each time and each state of the world. Miao and Zhang (2015) have developed a dual approach to the problem by considering a Lagrangian and derived a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in an infinite horizon. We consider a similar Lagrangian in a finite horizon, but transform the dual problem into an infinite series of optimal stopping problems. For each optimal stopping problem we provide an analytic solution by providing an integral equation representation for the free boundary. We provide a verification theorem that the value function of the original principal's problem is the Legender-Fenchel transform of the integral of the value functions of the optimal stopping problems. We also provide some numerical simulation results of optimal contracting strategies

Date: 2018-12, Revised 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ias and nep-mic
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