On Optimal Transparency in Signaling
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We examine the classic "Beer-Quiche" game from Cho and Kreps (1987), and relax the assumption that the order placed by the sender is completely observable. Under the optimal degree of transparency, the receiver achieves a higher payoff than with full transparency. Partial obfuscation of the sender's choice encourages separation: committing to a less informative signal about the sender's choice affects the endogenous information generation process such that the receiver thereby secures himself more information.
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