J. S. Mill's Liberal Principle and Unanimity

Edward Green

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The broad concept of an individual's welfare is actually a cluster of related specific concepts that bear a "family resemblance" to one another. One might care about how a policy will affect people both in terms of their subjective preferences and also in terms of some notion of their objective interests. This paper provides a framework for evaluation of policies in terms of welfare criteria that combine these two considerations. Sufficient conditions are provided for such a criterion to imply the same ranking of social states as does Pareto's unanimity criterion. Sufficiency is proved via study of a community of agents with interdependent ordinal preferences.

Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-ltv
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