The Role of Strategic Load Participants in Two-Stage Settlement Electricity Markets

Pengcheng You, Dennice F. Gayme and Enrique Mallada

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Two-stage electricity market clearing is designed to maintain market efficiency under ideal conditions, e.g., perfect forecast and nonstrategic generation. This work demonstrates that the individual strategic behavior of inelastic load participants in a two-stage settlement electricity market can deteriorate efficiency. Our analysis further implies that virtual bidding can play a role in alleviating this loss of efficiency by mitigating the market power of strategic load participants. We use real-world market data from New York ISO to validate our theory.

Date: 2019-03, Revised 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ene
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.08341 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1903.08341

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators (help@arxiv.org).