Conditions for stable equilibrium in Cournot duopoly models with tax evasion and time delay

Raul Villafuerte-Segura, Eduardo Alvarado-Santos and Benjamin A. Itza-Ortiz

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Abstract: We provide conditions for stable equilibrium in Cournot duopoly models with tax evasion and time delay. We prove that our conditions actually imply asymptotically stable equilibrium and delay independence. Conditions include the same marginal cost and equal probability for evading taxes. We give examples of cost and inverse demand functions satisfying the proposed conditions. Some economic interpretations of our results are also included.

Date: 2019-05, Revised 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-iue
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Published in Chaos 30, 013142 (2020)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1905.02817

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