Conditions for the stability of a Cournot duopoly model with tax evasion and time delay
Eduardo Alvarado-Santos and
Benjamin A. Itza-Ortiz
Papers from arXiv.org
We study a Cournot duopoly model with tax evasion and time delay. We prove that if the marginal production costs of both competing firms are equal then the equilibrium point is asymptotically stable and independent of time delay. As consequence, our model can not have bifurcations if the delay, as a parameter, is varied. It further imply that less tax evasion and higher public revenue can be achieved either by increasing the effectiveness of audits or by adjusting the penalties for tax evasion.
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