Cheating in Ranking Systems

Lihi Dery, Dror Hermel and Artyom Jelnov

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Consider an application sold on an on-line platform, with the app paying a commission fee and, henceforth, offered for sale on the platform. The ability to sell the application depends on its customer ranking. Therefore, developers may have an incentive to promote their applications ranking in a dishonest manner. One way to do this is by faking positive customer reviews. However, the platform is able to detect dishonest behavior (cheating) with some probability and then proceeds to decide whether to ban the application. We provide an analysis and find the equilibrium behaviors of both the applications developers (cheat or not) and the platform (setting of the commission fee). We provide initial insights into how the platforms detection accuracy affects the incentives of the app developers.

Date: 2019-05
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.09116 Latest version (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Cheating in Ranking Systems (2021)
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