Contest Architecture with Public Disclosures

Toomas Hinnosaar

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I study optimal disclosure policies in sequential contests. A contest designer chooses at which periods to publicly disclose the efforts of previous contestants. I provide results for a wide range of possible objectives for the contest designer. While different objectives involve different trade-offs, I show that under many circumstances the optimal contest is one of the three basic contest structures widely studied in the literature: simultaneous, first-mover, or sequential contest.

Date: 2019-05, Revised 2019-05
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