Coalitions in Repeated Games

S. Nageeb Ali and Ce Liu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history-dependent schemes that deter coalitions from blocking using continuation promises and punishments. We evaluate the effectiveness of these schemes across a range of settings, and apply our results to repeated matching and negotiations.

Date: 2019-06, Revised 2025-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.00280 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1906.00280

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().