Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium
Marco Frittelli and
Papers from arXiv.org
We propose a novel concept of a Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium (SORTE), which is inspired by the B\"uhlmann's classical notion of an Equilibrium Risk Exchange. We provide sufficient general assumptions that guarantee existence, uniqueness, and Pareto optimality of such a SORTE. In both the B\"uhlmann and the SORTE definition, each agent is behaving rationally by maximizing his/her expected utility given a budget constraint. The two approaches differ by the budget constraints. In B\"uhlmann's definition the vector that assigns the budget constraint is given a priori. On the contrary, in the SORTE approach, the vector that assigns the budget constraint is endogenously determined by solving a systemic utility maximization. SORTE gives priority to the systemic aspects of the problem, in order to optimize the overall systemic performance, rather than to individual rationality.
Date: 2019-07, Revised 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-rmg and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1907.04257
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