Contract Design with Costly Convex Self-Control

Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Daisuke Nakajima () and Emre Ozdenoren

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Abstract: In this note, we consider the pricing problem of a profit-maximizing monopolist who faces naive consumers with convex self-control preferences.

Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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