Behavioural Macroeconomic Policy: New perspectives on time inconsistency

Michelle Baddeley

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper brings together divergent approaches to time inconsistency from macroeconomic policy and behavioural economics. Behavioural discount functions from behavioural microeconomics are embedded into a game-theoretic analysis of temptation versus enforcement to construct an encompassing model, nesting combinations of time consistent and time inconsistent preferences. The analysis presented in this paper shows that, with hyperbolic/quasihyperbolic discounting, the enforceable range of inflation targets is narrowed. This suggests limits to the effectiveness of monetary targets, under certain conditions. The paper concludes with a discussion of monetary policy implications, explored specifically in the light of current macroeconomic policy debates.

Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-evo and nep-mac
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1907.07858

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