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Network and Agent Dynamics with Evolving Protection against Systemic Risk

Chulwook Park

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The dynamics of protection processes has been a fundamental challenge in systemic risk analysis. The conceptual principle and methodological techniques behind the mechanisms involved [in such dynamics] have been harder to grasp than researchers understood them to be. In this paper, we show how to construct a large variety of behaviors by applying a simple algorithm to networked agents, which could, conceivably, offer a straightforward way out of the complexity. The model starts with the probability that systemic risk spreads. Even in a very random social structure, the propagation of risk is guaranteed by an arbitrary network property of a set of elements. Despite intensive systemic risk, the potential of the absence of failure could also be driven when there has been a strong investment in protection through a heuristically evolved protection level. It is very interesting to discover that many applications are still seeking the mechanisms through which networked individuals build many of these protection process or mechanisms based on fitness due to evolutionary drift. Our implementation still needs to be polished against what happens in the real world, but in general, the approach could be useful for researchers and those who need to use protection dynamics to guard against systemic risk under intrinsic randomness in artificial circumstances.

Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hme
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