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Empirical strategy-proofness

Rodrigo Velez () and Alexander Brown ()

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Abstract: We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2019, arXiv:1804.07986) we determine that this behavior is plausible only when the social choice function violates a non-bossiness condition and information is not interior. Analysis of the accumulated experimental and empirical evidence on these games supports our findings.

Date: 2019-07, Revised 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp and nep-gth
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