Third person enforcement in a prisoner's dilemma game

Tatsuhiro Shichijo

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We theoretically study the effect of a third person enforcement on a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game played by two persons, with whom the third person plays repeated prisoner's dilemma games. We find that the possibility of the third person's future punishment causes them to cooperate in the one-shot game.

Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.04971 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1908.04971

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().