Time-inconsistent stopping, myopic adjustment & equilibrium stability: with a mean-variance application
S\"oren Christensen and
Papers from arXiv.org
For a discrete time Markov chain and in line with Strotz' consistent planning we develop a framework for problems of optimal stopping that are time-inconsistent due to the consideration of a non-linear function of an expected reward. We consider pure and mixed stopping strategies and a (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium. We provide different necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions including a verification theorem. Using a fixed point argument we provide equilibrium existence results. We adapt and study the notion of the myopic adjustment process and introduce different kinds of equilibrium stability. We show that neither existence nor uniqueness of equilibria should generally be expected. The developed theory is applied to a mean-variance problem and a variance problem.
Date: 2019-09, Revised 2020-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1909.11921
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