A Geometric Model of Opinion Polarization

Jan H\k{a}z{\l}a, Yan Jin, Elchanan Mossel and Govind Ramnarayan

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We introduce a simple, geometric model of opinion polarization. It is a model of political persuasion, as well as marketing and advertising, utilizing social values. It focuses on the interplay between different topics and persuasion efforts. We demonstrate that societal opinion polarization often arises as an unintended byproduct of influencers attempting to promote a product or idea. We discuss a number of mechanisms for the emergence of polarization involving one or more influencers, sending messages strategically, heuristically, or randomly. We also examine some computational aspects of choosing the most effective means of influencing agents, and the effects of those strategic considerations on polarization.

Date: 2019-10, Revised 2021-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.05274 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1910.05274

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().