Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information
Xiaosheng Mu and
Papers from arXiv.org
An agent has access to multiple information sources, each of which provides information about a different attribute of an unknown state. Information is acquired continuously\textemdash where the agent chooses both which sources to sample from, and also how to allocate attention across them\textemdash until an endogenously chosen time, at which point a decision is taken. We provide an exact characterization of the optimal information acquisition strategy for settings where the attributes are not too strongly correlated. We then apply this characterization to derive new results regarding: (1) endogenous information acquisition for binary choice, and (2) strategic information provision by competing news sources.
Date: 2019-10, Revised 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.07015 Latest version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1910.07015
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().