Persuasion with Coarse Communication

Yunus Aybas () and Eray Turkel

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In many real-world scenarios, experts must convey complex information with limited message capacity. This paper explores how the availability of messages influences an expert's persuasive ability. We develop a geometric representation of the expert's payoff with limited message capacity and identify bounds on the value of an additional signal for the sender. In a special class of games, the marginal value of a signal increases as the receiver becomes more difficult to persuade. Moreover, we show that access to an additional signal does not necessarily translate into more information transmitted in equilibrium, and the receiver might prefer coarser communication. This suggests that regulations on communication capacity have the potential to shift the balance of power from the expert to the decision-maker, ultimately improving welfare. Finally, we study the geometric properties of optimal information structures and show that the complexity of the sender's problem can be simplified to a finite algorithm.

Date: 2019-10, Revised 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1910.13547

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