Weak Monotone Comparative Statics

Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim and Fuhito Kojima

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics based on weak set order -- in short, weak monotone comparative statics -- and identify the enabling conditions in the context of individual choices, Pareto optimal choices% for a coalition of agents, Nash equilibria of games, and matching theory. Compared with the existing theory based on strong set order, the conditions for weak monotone comparative statics are weaker, sometimes considerably, in terms of the structure of the choice environments and underlying preferences of agents. We apply the theory to establish existence and monotone comparative statics of Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities and of stable many-to-one matchings in two-sided matching problems, allowing for general preferences that accommodate indifferences and incompleteness.

Date: 2019-11, Revised 2021-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1911.06442 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1911.06442

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators (help@arxiv.org).