Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules

Mostapha Diss and Boris Tsvelikhovskiy

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The present paper is devoted to study coalitional manipulability within the class of scoring voting rules. For any such rule and any number of alternatives, we introduce a new approach allowing to characterize all the outcomes that can be manipulable by a coalition of voters. This gives us the possibility to find the probability of manipulable outcomes for some well-studied scoring voting rules in case of small number of alternatives and large electorates under a well-known assumption on individual preference profiles.

Date: 2019-11, Revised 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1911.09173 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (2024)
Journal Article: Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (2021)
Working Paper: Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (2021)
Working Paper: Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1911.09173

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().