A Bilateral River Bargaining Problem with Negative Externality

Shivshanker Singh Patel and Parthasarathy Ramachandran

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This article is addressing the problem of river sharing between two agents along a river in the presence of negative externalities. Where, each agent claims river water based on the hydrological characteristics of the territories. The claims can be characterized by some international framework (principles) of entitlement. These international principles are appears to be inequitable by the other agents in the presence of negative externalities. The negotiated treaties address sharing water along with the issue of negative externalities imposed by the upstream agent on the downstream agents. The market based bargaining mechanism is used for modeling and for characterization of agreement points.

Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.05844 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1912.05844

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().